AsyncRAT Dropper: Stage-1 Loader Analysis
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Sample Metadata
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| SHA256 | a3f1c8... (truncated) |
| File type | PE32 .NET executable |
| First seen | 2026-04-08 |
| C2 protocol | TCP/6606 with AES-256-CBC |
Stage-1: PowerShell Dropper
The initial delivery is via a malicious Office document that executes a PowerShell one-liner using base64-encoded commands with -EncodedCommand.
AMSI Bypass
The loader patches AmsiScanBuffer in memory using reflection before loading the next stage:
[Ref].Assembly.GetType('System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils') |
ForEach-Object { $_.GetField('amsiInitFailed','NonPublic,Static').SetValue($null,$true) }
Process Hollowing
The final payload is injected into a suspended RegAsm.exe process via the classic NtWriteVirtualMemory + ResumeThread sequence.
Detection
YARA:
rule asyncrat_dropper_2026 {
strings:
$ps1 = "AmsiUtils" ascii wide
$ps2 = "amsiInitFailed" ascii wide
$pe = "RegAsm" ascii wide
condition:
2 of them
}
Sigma: process creation where Image ends with RegAsm.exe and parent is powershell.exe with -EncodedCommand in command line.